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Should One Nation Mean One Language? 
France, 1794. With the Reign of Terror in full swing, France at war with every other major European 
power, and civil war raging in the western provinces, the deputies of the National Convention took 
the time to consider a matter of crucial importance; the language of their fellow citizens. At the 
time, the majority of the population of France spoke little or no French, communicating instead 
through regional languages and dialects. The Revolutionaries feared that without linguistic unity the 
fledgling French Republic would be lost beneath a wave of counter-revolution and foreign invasion.  
The fears of these Revolutionaries offer some telling parallels with contemporary debates about the 
links between language and citizenship. Critics of mass immigration warn of dangerous, ghettoised 
minorities that threaten the cohesion and security of wider society. Migrants, they insist, must 
integrate themselves, above all by learning English. This is a favoured theme of the Prime Minister 
when discussing the issues surrounding immigration and citizenship, as seen in his recent comments 
on the language of immigrants, and especially Muslim women in the UK. The government plans to 
increase funding for schools teaching English to immigrants, but also require that those entering the 
country to live with their spouse learn English under threat of losing the right to remain in the UK. 
Cameron’s desire to build an ‘integrated and cohesive One Nation country’ resonates with the views 
expressed over two hundred years ago in a very different context by Bertrand Barère, a member of 
the French National Convention and the ruling Committee of Public Safety in 1794, for whom  
linguistic diversity was a grave threat. By linking an ignorance of English to backwardness, patriarchal 
oppression of women and the threat of violent extremism, Cameron echoes Barère, who claimed 
that ‘to leave citizens in ignorance of the national language is to betray the fatherland, it is to leave 
the stream of enlightenment poisoned or blocked in its path’. 
Concerns about the linguistic unity of nations have a long and often murky past. Just like Cameron, 
the Revolutionaries sought to impose the use of their national language on those who did not speak 
it. As the abbé Henri Grégoire, Barère’s colleague in the National Convention, remarked, the aim was 
to ‘annihilate’ other languages and ‘universalise’ French.  Schools were the favoured means of 
achieving this, and primary school teachers were obliged to instruct their students in the national 
language. During the nineteenth century a variety of unpleasant measures were developed in French 
classrooms to ensure the language took hold, most notably the use of the infamous ‘symbol’, the 
French counterpart to the Welsh Not. This involved the use of a ticket, ribbon or other token, which 
would be given to the first child to speak in their native tongue. The student would keep this object, 
sometimes grasping it arm extended, until another child used the language and the token could be 
passed on, with a punishment distributed to whoever was left holding it at the end of the day. This 
practice was intended not only to make sure children practiced their French, but to impart a sense of 
shame in speaking one’s native tongue, the use of which became a taboo equated with spitting in 
the regulations of some schools.  
Throughout the nineteenth century and across Europe, nationalists pursued linguistic unity with 
similar vigour, and this has often manifested itself in state sponsored discrimination. Linguistic 
minorities, especially Polish speakers, in the second German Reich suffered under Bismarck’s 
Kulturkampf during the last decades of the nineteenth century, experiences similar to those 
enduring Russification under the Tsars Alexander II and Alexander III at roughly the same time. As in 
France this involved the imposition of the national language in schools, and also the restriction civic 
rights and freedoms for linguistic minorities.  
This is not just about tolerance or intolerance of minorities; it also touches on questions of individual 
freedom and citizenship raised during the Revolution.  Cameron insists that teaching English to 
immigrants is also about individual freedom, that without access to the common language 
individuals are denied access to the choices enjoyed by the majority. The abbé Grégoire’s opposition 
to linguistic diversity in France during the Revolution had very similar roots. Grégoire feared that the 
interests and rights of ordinary people would never be recognised unless they could read and write 
enough French to participate in politics.  As Grégoire explicitly recognised in his speech before the 
Convention in 1794, the collective rights of minorities to have their culture respected conflicted with 
the rights of individuals to participate fully in society. These individual rights could be secured only 
through the intervention of the state. 
The UK today is not Revolutionary France, nor is it Tsarist Russia or Germany under Bismarck, but 
these historical experiences can illuminate our current debate about the relationship between 
language and citizenship. Perhaps most pertinently, it is worth observing that language policies have 
often not worked quite as politicians hoped. France only achieved a real degree of linguistic 
unification after WWII, revealing the limited ability of the state to impose its will in matters of 
language. Efforts under Napoleon to create a monolingual legal system were opposed by legal 
officials who continued to communicate with locals in regional languages in order to be understood. 
Grégoire, like many contemporaries, hoped that large scale conscription to the French speaking 
army would assimilate the rural population, but when veterans returned home they often returned 
also to the local dialect under pressure from families and lovers. Even the French school system, 
universal and free at primary level after 1881, was less important than urbanization and the 
development of transport links in the countryside. Discriminatory policies in Russia and Germany 
were often counter-productive, strengthening the appeal of minority identities and stimulating 
opposition and revolt. The history of language and state in Europe shows how the social and 
economic context influenced the linguistic choices of individuals far more than narrow interventions 
of the state. 
  
